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A NEW EFFICIENT ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED
ON THE SQUARE ROOT PROBLEM
M.R.K. ARIFFIN, M.A.ASBULLAH, AND N.A. ABU
Abstract. The square root modulo problem is a known primitive in designing
an asymmetric cryptosystem. It was first attempted by Rabin. Decryption
failure of the Rabin cryptosystem caused by the 4-to-1 decryption output is
overcome efficiently in this work. The proposed scheme (known as the AAβ-
cryptosystem) has its encryption speed having a complexity order faster than
the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, El-Gammal, RSA and ECC. It can also
transmit a larger data set securely when compared to existing asymmetric
schemes. It has a simple mathematical structure. Thus, it would have low
computational requirements and would enable communication devices with
low computing power to deploy secure communication procedures efficiently.
1. Introduction
The Rabin cryptosystem that utilizes the square root modulo problem, is said
to be an optimal implementation of RSA with the encryption exponent e = 2 [9].
However, the situation of a 4-to-1 mapping during decryption has deterred it from
being utilized. Mechanisms to ensure its possible implementation have been pro-
posed, however the solutions either still have a possibility of decryption failure or
the performance against the RSA is inadequate. As a consequence other underlying
cryptographic primitives have taken centre stage. The discrete log problem (DLP)
and the elliptic curve discrete log problem (ECDLP) has been the source of security
for cryptographic schemes such as the Diffie Hellman key exchange (DHKE) proce-
dure, El-Gamal cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) respectively
[1], [7]. As for the world renowned RSA cryptosystem, the inability to find the e-th
root of the ciphertext C modulo N from the congruence relation C ≡M e(mod N)
coupled with the inability to factor N = pq for large primes p and q is its fundamen-
tal source of security [10]. It has been suggested that the ECC is able to produce
the same level of security as the RSA with shorter key length. Thus, ECC should
be the preferred asymmetric cryptosystem when compared to RSA [15]. Hence, the
notion “cryptographic efficiency” is conjured. That is, to produce an asymmetric
cryptographic scheme that could produce security equivalent to a certain key length
of the traditional RSA but utilizing shorter keys. However, in certain situations
where a large block needs to be encrypted, RSA is the better option than ECC
because ECC would need more computational effort to undergo such a task [12].
Thus, adding another characteristic toward the notion of “cryptographic efficiency”
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which is it must be less “computational intensive” and be able to transmit large
blocks of data (when needed). In 1998 the cryptographic scheme known as NTRU
was proposed with better ”cryptographic efficiency” relative to RSA and ECC [4]
[5] [6]. NTRU has a complexity order of O(n2) for both encryption and decryption
as compared to DHKE, EL-Gammal, RSA and ECC (all have a complexity order
of O(n3)). As such, in order to design a state-of-the-art public key mechanism, the
following are characteristics that must be “ideally” achieved (apart from other well
known security issues):
(1) Shorter key length. If possible shorter than ECC 160-bits.
(2) Speed. To have speed of complexity order O(n2) for both encryption and
decryption.
(3) Able to increase data set to be transmitted asymmetrically. That is, not to
be restricted in size because of the mathematical structure.
(4) Simple mathematical structure for easy implementation.
In this paper, we attempt to efficiently enhance an asymmetric cryptosystem
based on the square root problem as its cryptogrpahic primitive. That is, we will
efficiently redesign Rabin’s cryptosytem that has decryption failure due to a 4-to-
1 mapping. We will show that in our design for encryption, it does not involve
“expensive” mathematical operation. Only basic multiplication is required without
division or modulo operation.
The layout of this paper is as follows. The Rabin cryptosystem will be discussed
in Section 2. Previous designs to overcome the decryption failure of the Rabin
cryptosystem will also be presented here. The mechanism of the AAβ-cryptosystem
will be detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, the authors detail the decryption process
and provide a proof of correctness. An example will also be presented. Continuing
in Section 5, we will discuss a congruence attack, a Coppersmith type attack and
a Euclidean division attack. An analysis of lattice based attack will be given in
Section 6. Section 7 will be about the underlying security principles of the AAβ
scheme. A table of comparison between the AAβ scheme against RSA,ECC and
NTRU is given in Section 8. Finally, we shall conclude in Section 9.
2. The Rabin Cryptosystem
Let us begin by stating that the communication process is between A (Along)
and B (Busu), where Busu is sending information to Along after encrypting the
plaintext with Along’s public key.
• Key Generation by Along
INPUT: Generate two random n-bit prime numbers p and q.
OUTPUT: The public key N = pq and the private key pair (p, q).
Remark 2.1. To simplify computation one may choose p ≡ q ≡ 3(mod 4).
• Encryption by Busu
INPUT: The public key N and the message M where 0 ≤M ≤ N − 1.
OUTPUT: The ciphertext C = M2(mod N).
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• Decryption by Along
INPUT: The private key pair (p, q) and the ciphertext C.
OUTPUT: The plaintext M .
Remark 2.2. Computing the square roots of C modulo N using the private keys
(p, q), would result in 4 square roots of C modulo N . Thus, the “infamous” de-
cryption failure scenario.
2.1. Redundancy Schemes for Unique Decryption. In order to overcome the
decryption failure, it is necessary to have a scheme that could provide the plaintext
upon decryption without having to guess. We provide here a brief description of 3
existing solution techniques.
(1) Redundancy in the message [8]. This scheme has a probability decryp-
tion failure of approximately 1
2l−1
where l is the least significant binary
string of the message.
(2) Extra bits [2]. One will send 2 extra bits of information to specify the
square root. The encryption process requires the computation of the Jacobi
symbol. This results in a computational overhead which is much more than
just computing a single square modulo N .
(3) Williams technique [14]. The encryption process requires the encrypter
to compute a Jacobi symbol. Hence, losing the performance advantage of
Rabin over RSA (as in point no.2).
In the next section, we will present an efficient enhancement of Rabin’s cryp-
tosystem that does not inherit the above properties.
3. The AAβ Public Key Cryptosystem
• Key Generation by Along
INPUT: The size n of the prime numbers.
OUTPUT: A public key tuple (n, eA1, eA2) and a private key pair (pq, d).
(1) Generate two random and distinct n-bit strong primes p and q satisfying{
p ≡ 3(mod 4), 2n < p < 2n+1,
q ≡ 3(mod 4), 2n < q < 2n+1.
(2) Choose random d such that d > (p2q)
4
9 .
(3) Choose random integer e such that ed ≡ 1(mod pq) and add multiples of
pq until 23n+4 < e < 23n+6 (if necessary).
(4) Set eA1 = p
2q. We have 23n < eA1 < 2
3n+3.
(5) Set eA2 = e.
(6) Return the public key tuple (n, eA1, eA2) and a private key pair (pq, d).
We also have the fact that 22n < pq < 22n+2.
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• Encryption by Busu
INPUT: The public key tuple (n, eA1, eA2) and the message M.
OUTPUT: The ciphertext C.
(1) Represent the messageM as a 4n-bit integerm within the interval (24n−1, 24n)
with m = m1 · 2
n+m2 where m1 is a 3n+1-bit integer within the interval
(23n, 23n+1) and m2 is a n− 1-bit integer within the interval (2
n−2, 2n−1).
(2) Choose a random n-bit integer k1 within the interval (2
n−1, 2n) and com-
pute U = m1 · 2
n + k1. We have 2
4n < U < 24n+1.
(3) Choose a random n-bit integer k2 within the interval (2
n−1, 2n) and com-
pute and compute V = m2 · 2
n + k2. We have 2
2n−2 < V < 22n−1.
(4) Compute C = UeA1 + V
2eA2.
(5) Send ciphertext C to Along.
4. Decryption
Proposition 4.1. Decryption by Along is conducted in the following steps:
INPUT: The private key (pq, d) and the ciphertext C.
OUTPUT: The plaintext M.
(1) Compute W ≡ Cd(mod pq).
(2) Compute M1 ≡ q
−1(mod p) and M2 ≡ p
−1(mod q).
(3) Compute
xp ≡W
p+1
4 (mod p), xq ≡W
q+1
4 (mod q).
(4) Compute
V1 ≡ xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V2 ≡ xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq),
V3 ≡ −xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V4 ≡ −xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq).
(5) For i = 1, 2, 3, 4 compute Ui =
C−V 2i eA2
eA1
.
(6) Sort the pair (Uj , Vj) for integer Uj .
(7) Compute integral part m1 = ⌊
Uj
2n
⌋.
(8) Compute integral part m2 = ⌊
Vj
2n
⌋.
(9) Form the integer m = m1 · 2
n +m2.
(10) Transform the number m to the message M.
(11) Return the message M.
We now proceed to give a proof of correctness.
Along will begin by computing W ≡ Cd ≡ V 2(mod pq). Along will then have to
solve W ≡ V 2(mod pq) using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
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Lemma 4.2. Let p and q be two different primes such that p ≡ 3(mod 4) and
q ≡ 3(mod 4). Define xp and xq by
xp ≡W
p+1
4 (mod p), xq ≡W
q+1
4 (mod q).
Then the solutions of the equation x2 ≡ W (mod p) are ±xp(mod p) and the solu-
tions of the equation x2 ≡W (mod q) are ±xq(mod q).
Lemma 4.3. Let p and q be two different primes such that p ≡ 3(mod 4) and
q ≡ 3(mod 4). Define xp and xq by
xp ≡W
p+1
4 (mod p), xq ≡W
q+1
4 (mod q).
Define M1 ≡ q
−1(mod p) and M2 ≡ p
−1(mod q). Then the solutions of the equation
V 2 ≡W (mod pq) are
V1 ≡ xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V2 ≡ xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq),
V3 ≡ −xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V4 ≡ −xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq).
To solve the equation V 2 ≡ W (mod pq), we use the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Consider the equations x2p ≡W (mod p) and x
2
q ≡W (mod q). Then the solution of
the equation V 2 ≡W (mod pq) are the four solutions of the four systems{
V ≡ ±xp(mod p)
V ≡ ±xq(mod q)
Define M1 ≡ q
−1(mod p) and M2 ≡ p
−1(mod q). We will get explicitly
V1 ≡ xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V2 ≡ xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq),
V3 ≡ −xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V4 ≡ −xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq).
It can be seen that solving V 2 ≡ W (mod pq), we will get four solutions Vi for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
We prove below that only one of them leads to the correct decryption and con-
sequently, there is no decryption failure.
Lemma 4.4. Let C be an integer representing a ciphertext encrypted by the AAβ
algorithm. The equation C = UeA1 + V
2eA2 has only one solution satisfying V <
22n−1.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there are two couples of solutions (U1, V1)
and (U2, V2) of the equation C = UeA1 + V
2eA2 with V1 6= V2 and Vi < 2
2n−1.
Then U1eA1 + V
2
1 eA2 = U2eA1 + V
2
2 eA2. Using eA1 = p
2q, this leads to
(U2 − U1)p
2q = (V1 + V2)(V1 − V2)eA2.
Since gcd(p2q, eA2) = 1, then p
2q|(V1 + V2)(V1 − V2) and the prime numbers p and
q satisfy one of the conditions
p2|(V1 ± V2) or
{
pq|(V1 ± V2)
p |(V1 ∓ V2)
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Observe that p2 > 22n and pq > 22n while |V1 ± V2| < 2 · 2
2n−1 = 22n. This implies
that none of these conditions is possible. Hence the equation C = UeA1 + V
2eA2
has only one solution with the parameters of the scheme 
4.1. Example. Let n = 16. Along will choose the primes p = 62683 and q = 62483.
The public keys will be
(1) eA1 = 245505609868187
(2) eA2 = 4106878163802480
The private keys will be
(1) pq = 3916621889
(2) d = 2486483
Busu’s message will contain the following parameters
(1) m1 = 544644664056570
(2) m2 = 21777
Busu will also generate the following ephemeral random session keys
(1) k1 = 54433
(2) k2 = 33079
Busu will then generate
(1) U = 35693832703611425953
(2) V = 1427210551 and consequently V 2 = 2036929956885723601
The ciphertext will be C = 17128459327562266456602243879187691.
To decrypt Along will first compute W = 3215349249. Along will then obtain the
following root values
V1 = 318887097,
V2 = 2489411338,
V3 = 1427210551,
and
V4 = 3597734792.
Only U3 =
C−V 23 eA2
eA1
will produce an integer value. That is U3 = 35693832703611425953.
Finally, m1 and m2 can be obtained. 
5. Basic Attacks
5.1. Congruence attack. In this subsection we will observe the security of the ci-
phertext equation C = UeA1+V
2eA2 when it is treated as a Diophantine equation.
We will observe that solving the corresponding Diophantine equation parametric
solution set for the unknown parameters U and V 2 will result in exponentially many
candidates to choose from.
From C = UeA1 + V
2eA2 and since gcd(eA1, eA2) = 1 we have
U ≡ Ce−1A1 ≡ a (mod eA2).
Hence U = a+ eA2j for some j ∈ Z. Replacing into C we have
C = UeA1 + V
2eA2 = (a+ eA2j)eA1 + V
2eA2.
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Then,
V 2 =
C − (a+ eA2j)eA1
eA2
=
C − eA1a
eA2
− eA1j,
where C−eA1a
eA2
= b ∈ Z. It follows that the equation C = UeA1 + V
2eA2 has the
parametric solutions
U = a+ eA2j and V
2 = b− eA1j.
• Computing with U
To find U = a+ eA2j, we should find an integer j such that 2
4n < U < 24n+1. This
gives
24n − a
eA2
< j <
24n+1 − a
eA2
.
We know that 23n+4 < eA2 < 2
3n+6. Then the difference between the upper and
the lower bound is
24n+1 − a
eA2
−
24n − a
eA2
=
24n
eA2
>
24n
23n+6
= 2n−6.
Hence the difference is very large and finding the correct j is infeasible.
• Computing with V 2
To find V 2 = b − eA1j, we should find an integer j such that 2
4n−4 < V < 24n−2.
This gives
24n−4 − b
−eA1
> j >
24n−2 − b
−eA1
.
We know that 23n < eA1 < 2
3n+3. Then the difference between the upper and the
lower bound is
24n−4 − b
−eA1
−
24n−2 − b
−eA1
=
3 · 24n−4
eA1
= 3 · 2n−7.
Hence the difference is very large and finding the correct j is infeasible.
5.2. Coppersmith type attack.
Theorem 5.1. Let N be an integer of unknown factorization. Furthermore, let
fN(x) be an univariate, monic polynomial of degree δ. Then we can find all solutions
x0 for the equation fN (x) ≡ 0(mod N) with
|x0| < N
1
δ .
in time polynomial in (logN, δ).
Theorem 5.2. Let N be an integer of unknown factorization, which has a divisor
b > Nβ. Furthermore let fb(x) be an univariate, monic polynimial of degree δ.
Then we can find all solutions x0 for the equation fb(x) ≡ 0(mod b) with
|x0| ≤
1
2
N
β2
δ
−ǫ
in polynomial time in (logN, δ, 1
ǫ
).
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• Attacking V
With reference to Theorem 1. Let N = eA1 = p
2q and d′ ≡ e−1(mod N). Compute
W ≡ Cd′ ≡ V 2(mod N). Let fN (x) ≡ x
2 −W ≡ 0(mod N). Hence, δ = 2. Thus
the root x0 = V can be recovered if V < N
1
2 ≈ 21.5n. But since V ≈ 22n, this
attack is infeasible.
• Attacking d
With reference to Theorem 2. We begin by observing fb(x) = ex− 1 ≡ 0(mod pq)
where pq in an unknown factor of N = eA1 = p
2q. Since pq > N
2
3 we have β = 2
3
.
From fb(x) we also have δ = 1. By the Coppersmith theorem, the root x0 = d can
be found if |x0| < N
4
9 .But since d > N
4
9 , this attack is infeasible.
5.3. Euclidean division attack. From C = UeA1+V
2eA2, the size of each public
parameter within C ensures that Euclidean division attacks does not occur. This
can be easily deduced as follows:
(1) ⌊ C
eA1
⌋ 6= U
(2) ⌊ C
eA2
⌋ 6= V 2
6. Analysis on lattice based attack
The square lattice attack has been an efficient and effective means of attack upon
schemes that are designed based on Diophantine equations. The AAβ scheme has
gone through analysis regarding lattice attacks while it went through the design
process. Let C = UeA1 + V
2eA2 be an AAβ ciphertext. Consider the diophan-
tine equation eA1x1 + eA2x2 = C. Introduce the unknown x3 and consider the
diophantine equation
eA1x1 + eA2x2 − Cx3 = 0.
Then (U, V 2, 1) is a solution of the equation. Next let T be a number to fixed later.
Consider the lattice L spanned by the matrix:
M0 =

 1 0 eA1T0 1 eA2T
0 0 −CT


Observe that
(x1, x2, x3)M0 = (x1, x2, T (eA1x1 + eA2x2 − Cx3)).
This shows that the lattice L contains the vectors (x1, x2, T (eA1x1+ eA2x2−Cx3))
and more precisely the vector-solution V0 = (U, V
2, 0). Observe that the length of
V0 satisfies
‖V0‖ =
√
U2 + V 4 ≈ 24n.
On the other hand, the determinant of the lattice is det(L) = CT and the Gaussian
heuristics for the lattice L asserts that the length of its shortest non-zero vector is
usually approximately σ(L) where
σ(L) =
√
dim(L)
2pie
det(L)
1
dim(L) =
√
3
2pie
(CT )
1
3 .
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If we choose T such that σ(L) > ‖V0‖, then V0 can be among the short non-zero
vectors of the lattice L. To this end, T should satisfy
(6.1) T > (
pie
2
)
3
2 ·
212n
C
Next, if we apply the LLL algorithm to the lattice L, we will find a basis (b1, b2, b3)
such that ‖b1‖ ≤ ‖b2‖ ≤ ‖b3‖ and
bi ≤ 2
n(n−1)
4(n+1−i) det(L)
1
n+1−i , for i = 1, ..., 4 and n = 3.
For i = 1, we choose T such that ‖V0‖ ≤ ‖b1‖ ≤ 2
1
2 (CT )
1
3 . Using the approximation
‖V0‖ ≈ 2
4n, this is satisfied if
V > 2−
1
2 ·
212n
C
,
which follows from the lower bound of equation (3). We experimented this result
to try to find (U, V 2, 0). The LLL algorithm outputs a basis with a matrix in the
form
M1 =

 a11 a12 0a21 a22 0
a31 a32 T


If (U, V 2, 0) is a short vector, then (U, V 2, 0) = (x1, x2, x3)M1 for some short vector
(x1, x2, x3). We then deduce the system{
a11x1 + a21x2 = U
a12x1 + a22x2 = V
2
from which we can deduce that x3 = 0. If we compute (UeA1 − V
2eA2)/C, we get
x2 = 1 for some x1. It follows that{
a11x1 + a21 = U
a12x1 + a22 = V
2
This situation is similar to the congruence attack. We can also observe that this is
a system of two equations with three unknowns (i.e. x1, U, V ).
6.1. Example with lattice based attack. We will use the parameters in the
earlier example. Observe the lattice L spanned by the matrix:
M0 =

 1 0 eA1T0 1 eA2T
0 0 −CT


the length of the vector V = (U, V 2, 0) is approximately ‖ V ‖≈ 35751905917344588937.
We will use T = 220n which would result in the length of the vector V is shorter
than the gaussian heuristic of the lattice L.
The LLL algorithm outputs the matrix M1 given by:
 −4106878163802480 245505609868187 0247367271832221073 4155888875658045598 0
−1118395942494397 66856738131713 T


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7. Underlying security principles
7.1. The integer factorization problem. To find the unknown composite p and
q such that eA1 = p
2q.
7.2. The square root modulo problem. Since gcd(eA1, eA2) = 1, one can obtain
the relation V 2 ≡ α(mod eA1). Since eA1 = p
2q, then this is equivalent to calcu-
lating square roots modulo composite integers with unknown factorization which is
infeasible.
7.3. The modular reduction problem. Since gcd(eA1, eA2) = 1, one can obtain
U ≡ β(mod eA2). Since U ≫ eA2, to compute U prior to modular reduction by eA2
is infeasible.
7.4. Equivalence with integer factorization. From C = UeA1+V
2eA2 we have
C ≡ V 2(mod eA1)
where eA1 = p
2q is of unknown factorization. We show here that solving this
congruence relation is equivalent to factoring eA1. If we know the factorization of
eA1, then it is easy to solve the congruence relation. Conversely, suppose that we
know all the solutions. By Lemma 2, the four solutions are
V1 ≡ xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V2 ≡ xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq),
V3 ≡ −xpM1q + xqM2p (mod pq),
V4 ≡ −xpM1q − xqM2p (mod pq).
and are such that Vi < pq for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. We will now have V1+V3 = 2xqM2p+αpq
for some integer α. Then V1+V3 ≡ 0(mod p). On the other hand, V1+V3 < 2pq <
p2q. Hence V1 + V3 6≡ 0(mod p
2q). Therefore
p = gcd(eA1, V1 + V3) = gcd(p
2q, V1 + V3).
Hence q = p
2q
p2
.
8. Table of Comparison
The following is a table of comparison between RSA, ECC, NTRU and AAβ .
Let |E| denote public key size. The AAβ cryptosystem has the ability to encrypt
large data sets (i.e. 4n-bits of data per transmission). The ratio ofM : |E| suggests
better economical value per public key bit being used.
Algorithm Encryption Decryption Ratio Ratio
Speed Speed M : C M : |E|
RSA O(nlogn2) O(nlogn2) 1 : 1 1 : 2
ECC O(n3) O(n3) 1 : 2 1 : 2
NTRU O(n2) O(n2) Varies [4] N/A
AAβ O(n
2) O(n2) 1 : 1.75 1 : 1.5
Table 1. Comparison table for input block of length n
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For the decryption process off the AAβ scheme, the value of k stated in its
complexity is a “small” constant. Empirical evidence for length n = 512 (i.e. the
length of the prime is 512 bits) which would result in total public key length to be
6n = 3072 bits, when decrypting
9. Conclusion
The asymmetric scheme presented in this paper provides a secure avenue for
implementors who need to transmit up to 4n-bits of data per transmission. With
an expansion rate of 1 : 1.75 the ciphertext to be transmitted is not much more
larger than the ratio of the ECC. Eventhough its expansion rate is larger than
RSA, this is only natural since it is transmitting a larger data set. This will give
a significant contribution in a niche area for implementation of asymmetric type
security in transmitting large data sets.
The scheme is also comparable to the Rabin cryptosystem with the advantage
of having a unique decryption result. It has achieved an encryption and decryp-
tion speed with complexity order of O(n2) and it also has a simple mathematical
structure for easy implementation.
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